INTERNATIONAL LAW.

There is no subject in the range of judicial science possessing such intrinsic claims to attention as that of international law. The foundations on which it rests-the sanctions by which it is enforced-the difficulty of the questions
involved-the magnitude of the interests concerned-all and
each of these considerations affords matter for curious and
most interesting contemplation. The great nations of antiquity, which have contributed most to the civilization of
modern Europe, have given least to this branch of civilization. If we look at the history of the Jews we find a total
absence of the sense of duty in relation to other nations.
Nearly all our knowledge of international law among ancient
States is derived from their intercourse with the Jews, and with
the Greeks, and Romans, more particularly with the latter.
Most of the rules were founded on religion. Treaties were
sanctioned with solemn oaths, the violation of which it was
believed would be followed by the vengeance of the gods.
War between nations of the same race and religion was
declared with sacred rites and ceremonies, but when once
begun it was waged with little rule or check. The herald
proclaimed its existence by devoting the enemy to the infernal gods. Ambassadors and heralds always possessed a
sacred character.
The division of the Greek world into a large number of
independent communities favored the existence of an Hellenic
law of nations, presenting in many points-such as the recognition of common Hellenic customs, religious and political,
and of the principle of a balance of power-a parallel to
modern international law. They generally gave quarter,
allowed the ransom of prisoners, respected trophies, and
allowed truces for the burying of the dead; and they had
a usage bearing a resemblance to the modern consular system. The Jus Feciale of the earlier Roman law, regulating
the formal intercotirse between Rome and other nations, is
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indeed the germ of what might have been a system of pure
international law. But the rise of the.Roman republic to the
-nastery of the world rendered such a thing as international
law unnecessary and impossible. The reason for this is clear;
international law rests upon two great maxims-that nations
are mutually independent and that they are equal-but the
history of Rome shows the exaggerated notions of Roman
superiority, and the constant aim of the Roman people to
destroy all other power and independence but their own. The
chronic state of war, and the lust of conquest, which mark
the history of Rome, were unfavorable to the growth of anything like that friendly union among States which is produclive not only of reciprocal rights and obligations, but of recipTocal esteem. When we look at the fierce spirit of conquest
amongst the Romans, and their barbarous international customs, such as is to be found in their haughty triumphs, in
their gladiatorial shows, when wretched captiveswere "butchered to make a Roman holiday ;" in the barbarous doctrine
-of law maintained even in Justinian's time, that prisoners of
-war became slaves jure gentium, and that the consequence of
'captivity, even in time of peace, was slavery and loss of prop,city; it can scarcely be said that modern international law is
-derived from ancient Rome. In the midst of these barbarous
-customs, there were, however, some redeeming features, such,
for instance, as the allowing prisoners of war to purchase
their freedom, and selling them only when unransomed, and
,from this practice, in the course of time, grew up the more
'humane custom of allowing the exchange of prisoners. Cap,ives were not maltreated by the Romans, as the Athenians
-were at Syracuse by Greek conquerors, with the exception of
.kings and generals, who were, at least in Cicero's day, butch.ered without mercy, after having been led in triumph through
-the city. Nor did the Romans entirely deprive the inhabi"tants of the conquered country of their lands; they allowed
,them to retain some small portion, on the condition that they
paid rent for the same as tenants (coloni). But of a system
.of law which conceived of States as the subjects of rights
-and duties, as members of a c6mmunity of nations, the pol-
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ished and elegant jurisprudence of antiquity furnishes hardly.
a trace. In the same consummate code which still rules the
most complex relations of life with a wisdom and justice;.
which modem culture has hardly been able to improve, stand
side by side the high morality of a completed system og
equity jurisprudence, and the savage doctrine that strangers
are enemies, and that with enemies war is eternal. Amid
such relations of States, there was no place for law. But:
when from the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood oF
man, the inevitable corollary of the brotherhood of nations;
was deduced, a body of law to govern this new commtnityfollowed as an inevitable consequence. It grew slowly at
first, for the age was technical, and dynastic interests longabsorbed the cares of statesmen. Scholia4s and commentators denied that there could be a law of nations, for where
was the superior authority to enact it ? It was difficult for
lawyers to conceive of law without a tribunal to enforce itPrinces refused to admit that any rules restrained the prerogatives for which they claimed divine origin. Mr. Ward (in his
"History of the Law of Nations," vol. I. 322-328) 9numerates five institutions existing about the period of the i ith
century which made a deep impression upon Europe, and contributed in a very essential degree to improve the Law of
Nations. These institutions were the feudal system, the concurrence of Europe in one form of religious worship and government, the establishment of chivalry, the negotiations and
treaties forming the conventional law of Europe, and the settlement of a scale of political rank and precedency.
The spirit of chivalry encouraged high sentiments of honor
and fidelity, and gave a moral sanction to the observance of
treaties, and rendered fraud and unfair advantage over a rival
unworthy of the true knight; it threw a lustre over the defence of the weak and unprotected; and it cultivated humane
feelings towards each other among the rulers of society.
Chivalry dictated humane treatment to the vanquished andcourtesy to enemies. The influence of Christianity was veryefficient towards the introduction of a better and more enlightened sense of right and justice among the government&
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of Europe. Indeed, as Laurent says, the idea of a system of
international law is due to Christianity. For how could there
be any legal tie between man as an individual and men as
people and nations until the consciousness of a common
nature was acknowledged; until the gulf which separated the
free man from the slave was filled up; until the contempt for
or hatred of the stranger as barbarian or enemy was removed;
until man's nature was changed, and war ceased to be regarded as a glorious pastime, or an ordinary occupation, and
until an equitable system was substituted for one huge overgrown empire ever striving to draw all neighbors within its
grasp and to maintain unlimited rule? (Histoiredu droit des
gens. Laurent, Tome iv. libre iii. ch. I). Christian nations
were bound together by a sense of common duty and interest
in respect to the rest of mankind. The history of Europe,
during the early periods of modem history, contains many
cases to show the authority of the Church over turbulent
princes and fierce warriors, checking violence and introducing
a system of morals which inculcated peace, moderation and
justice. The government of the Church by a monarch, who
gradually gained great political power, the presence in Europe
of an ultimate interpreter in questions relating to religion and
morals, no doubt did a great amount of good as well as a
great amount of harm. All important questions of politics
had some sort of bearing on religion, which could bring them
up for examination and settlement before the Roman Pontiff;
and the very vagueness of the theory of papal interference
aided its success on favorable occasions. Innocent III. said:
"Nos secundum plenitudinem potestatis dejure pos~umus supra
'us dispensare." (C. 4 x. De concessioneprabendu.) The oath
of fealty was the moral ligament of society, but the Roman
Pontiffs claimed the right to release vassals from their oaths
of allegiance on the ground that kings and princes who were
disobedient to the Church might be excommunicated, and
that excommunicated persons ought not to rule over Christians. The popes acted as arbitrators between prince and
prince, and between prince and people; they protected the
weak against the strong, and right against might. The prin-
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ciple grew up that disputes between nations should be decided
according to law and Christian morality, and that war, when
inevitable, should be conducted according to recognized rules
laid down in the interest of humanity.
The influence of treaties, conventions, and commercial associations helped greatly to form the modern code of public
law. The rights of commerce began to be regarded as under
the protection of the Law of Nations. Efforts were made,
upon the revival of commerce, to suppress piracy and protect
shipwrecked property. Pillage had become an inveterate
moral pestilence. Papal bulls and the excommunication of
the Church were not powerful enoilgh to put an end to these
evils. Conventions and treaties between sovereigns, on the
revival of commerce, contributed gradually to suppress this
criminal practice by rendering the regulations on the subject
a part of the Law of Nations. But it was reserved, says
Valen, to the ordinances of Louis XIV. to finally extinguish
this species of piracy by declaring that shipwrecked persons
ard property were placed under the special protection of the
crown, and the punishment of death, without hope of pardon,
was pronounced against the guilty.
Such was the Law of Nations when Grotius lived (A. D.
1625). It had been reduced to some degree of science and
civility by the influenc6 of Christianity, the study of Roman
law, and the spirit of commerce. But it was still in a state
of great disorder, and its principles were little known and less
observed. It consisted of a collection of undigested precedents, without order or authority. The work of Grotius, De
lure Belli el Pads,published in 1624, definitely laid down the
foundation of the science of international law, and his work
was shaped in imitation of the institutional treatises of Roman
law. The object of Grotius was to correct the false theories
and pernicious maxims, which then existed, by showing a
community of sentiment among the wise and learned of all
nations and ages in favor of the natural law of morality. He
also endeavored to show that justice was of perpetual obligation and essential to the well-being of every society, and that
the great commonwealth of nations stood in need of law, the
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observance of faith, and the practice of justice. His idea was
to digest in one systematic code the principles of public right,
and to supply authorities for almost every case in the conduct
of nations. Thus he had the honor of reducing the Law of
Nations to a system, and of producing a work which has been
resorted to as the standard of authority in every succeeding
age. He is, therefore, justly entitled to be called the father of
the Law of Nations.
The general desire of mankind that the mutual conduct of
nations should be governed, or at least directed, by recognized
rules-that there should be some principles to be invoked by
the weak, and yielded to without humiliation by the powerful
-has produced, indeed, a literature in international jurisprudence exceeding in magnitude that which has been employed
on any other branch of the moral sciences. Many of the
writers have been remarkable for sagacity, and almost all have
been men of diligence and learning, and devoted to the subject
of their labors. By the term international law, is meant that
collection of rules, customary, conventional and judicial, which
are accepted as binding inter se by the civilized nations of the
world. -International law lays down rules to be observed in
the mutual dealings of nations, which are at peace with each
other, and of nations which are at war with each other; and
it determines the rights and duties of belligerent and neutral
nations. But the rules of international law which relate to
war are more voluminous and certain than those which govern
nations in time of peace. International law as a ivhole is
capable of being very differently interpreted according to the
point of view from which it is regarded, and its rules vary
By some
infinitely in point of certainty and acceptance.
jurists it is considered improper to speak of these rules as
laws; they are merely moral principles, as they are destitute
of the sanctioning force which is the distinguishing quality of
law proper. Whilst other jurists derive its principles from
some transcendental source, such as nature, the Divine will,
reason, etc., and these do not hesitate to attribute to its rules an
intrinsic authority over all the nations of the world. According to this theory, the usage of nations is evidence of, but not
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the origin, of the law. It merely expresses the consent of
nations to things which are naturally-that is, by the law of
God-binding upon them. There is, however, no legislative
or judicial authority recognized by all the nations of the
world that regulates the reciprocal relations of States, and
consequently no express laws, except those which result from
the conventions which States may make with one another.
So that, however long established or useful any or all of these
rules may be, there is but one real remedy for their infraction, and that remedy is the sword. True, public opinion may
be and often is appealed to with considerable force, in cases of
violation of international morality, yet such appeal is not
always attended with success, and at the best it affords but a
precarious defence against the acts of powerful nations. The
foundation, therefore, upon which international law rests is the
consent of nations.
The rules of human conduct to which the word "Law" is
applied are thus 'classified by Locke, (I) The Divine law ;
(2) The Civil law; and (3) The Law of Opinion or Reputation.
The law of nations may be divided into, firstly, the rules of
international conduct which we believe to be commanded by
the Deity, and which may be called the Divine law of nations,
the natural law of nations, or more concisely, international
morality; and, secondly, the rules of conduct which are dictated or permitted by the public opinion of nations, and which
may be called the human, the actual, the secured, or the
positive law of nations. To avoid the confusion incident to
the use of one word to express rules of conduct often different,
both in themselves, and in their sources, it will be as well to
style the Divine or natural law of nations, .International
Morality; and confine the term InternationalLaw to the rules
of conduct, whether consistent or not with international
morality, which- are sanctioned by the public 'opinion of
nations. A passage in the work of Hobbes' De Cive, appears,
from the constant reference to it by subsequent writers, to
have had an extensive influence on the theory of international
morality. In that passage Hobbes affirms, that organized
nations assume the personal characters of men, and con-
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sequently that there is no difference between the moral rules
which ought to be observed by individuals. (Lex natural&
diddi potest in naturalem nominum et civitatum, quo vudgo jus
gentium appellatur. Precepta utriusque eadem sunt-quia
civitates semel institute induunt proprietates hominum personales.-hnperium cap. xiv. sect 4). In fact, however, the
analogy between nations and individuals is so imperfect, that
we are seldom warranted in inferring as to the one, conclusions
which have been established as to the other. In the first
place, the principal rules of morality among men relate to
what have been called imperfect obligations, and direct what
is to be done, not what is to be avoided. The negative
precept, not to injure, is merged, in the positive precept, to do
good. But in the existing state of human improvement,
almost all the precepts of international morality are negative.
A time may come when it may be useful to inculcate international benevolence; but if we confine our efforts to attainable
objects, we must be satisfied for the present with endeavoring
to enforce international justice. To suppose that a nation,
such as nations now are, unless with a view to enrich a
customer, or to strengthen an ally, or to weaken an enemy, or
to raise a barrier against a rival, or for some other selfish
purpose, will actively strive to increase the power or wealth of
another, is a vision in which no practical politician can indulge.
Instances may, indeed, be pointed out in which a people, too
weak to excite jealousy, has received disinterested assistanceBut such instances are very rare. Great must be the progress
of civilization, before the most sanguine international moralist
can hope to do more than to diminish fraud and violence, to
preserve the weak from treachery and oppression, and to
prevent the strong from tearing one another to pieces.
A further difference between the morality of nations and
the morality of individuals, arises from the necessity imposed
on the former of self-protection. An individual is protected
by the law. His cottage is not endangered by the palace which
arises in its vicinity. There is, therefore, no need for him to
take measures to diminish the power of his neighbors. But
one of the best established principles of international morality
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dedlares, that, under certain circumstances, it is not only the
right, but the duty of the general body of nations to prevent
anyone from acquiring a preponderance of force dangerous to,
all the others.
Again, it is now an admitted doctrine that between
individuals a contract obtained by violence is not binding..
But all Europe was shocked at the immorality of the statesman- who ventured to proclaim that the treaties of 1815 were
not binding on France, having been wrung from her when herarmies had been defeated and her fortresses captured, and
while her capital was in the possession of the enemy. It is forthe welfare of society that agreements entered into by an individual while under duress, should be void. On the other hand,
the welfare of society requires that engagements entered into
by a nation under duress should be held binding; for if they
were not, wars would terminate only by the utter subjugation
and ruin of the weaker party. If the Allies had believed that
their treaties with France were merely waste paper, they must
have destroyed her fortresses and partitioned her territoryThey ventured to leave her powerful, only because they
thought they could rely on her engagements.
And, lastly, there is a marked difference in the force of the
sanctions which tend to restrain immorality among men, and
those which tend to restrain it among nations. These sanctions
are moral or physical. The physical sanction is the fear of
injury to person or to property. The moral sanction is the
fear of punishment in a future world, or the loss of honor, of
reputation, or self-esteem in this. But the attempt to bind
nations by mere moral sanctions, is to fetter giants with cobwebs. To the greatest of human restraints, the fear of a hereafter, they are insensible. Again, nations, are not restrained
by fear of the loss of honor; for honor, in the sense in which
that word is applied to individuals, does not apply to them.
Among educated Europeans, these imputations are in men
cowardice and falsehood; and in women unchastity. But as a
nation cannot be excluded from the society of other nations,
a nation cannot lose its honor in the sense in which honor is
lost by an individual. Never has the foreign policy of France
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been more rapacious, more faithless, or more cruel, than
during the reign of Louis XIV. For half a century she
habitually maintained a conduct, a single instance of which
would have excluded an individual from the society of his
equals. At no time was France more admired, and even
courted. What are often called injuries to the honor of a
nation are injuries to its vanity. The qualities of which
nations are most vain, are force and boldness. They know
that, so far as they are supposed to possess these qualities,
they are themselves unlikely to be injured, and may injure
others with impunity. What they most fear, therefore, is
betraying timidity, which is an index and cause of weakness.
But timidity, which excludes a man from society, makes a
nation only the more acceptable. The fear of loss of reputation is, indeed, a restraint; and among the nations that desire
to be respected for justice, a considerable one. But such
nations are few. Strength and courage--or as it is usually
termed spirit-not integrity and moderation, are the qualities
for which most nations desire to be admired. If they can
succeed in inspiring fear, they are indifferent to hatred. It
appears, therefore, that the fear of physical evil, the fear of
injury to the persons or to the properties of the members of
the community, is the principal restraint on the conduct of
nations. As a protection to the weak, of course, it is trifling;
and the rights of weak nations, therefore, unless they acquire
the advantages of strength by confederacy, are always disregarded by the strong. But when a nation perceives a
probability that it will be resisted, and a possibility that it may
fail, the check is powerful-more powerful, in most cases than
that imposed by the physical sanction on individuals. When
an individual proposes to break the municipal law, he expects
to escape detection, and he generally knows the amount of
evil which, if he be detected, will follow. A nation, on the
other hand, never escapes detection, and never can estimate
the amount of suffering which it may incur. The law of
nations appears at first sight to resemble those of Draco. It
seems to have only one punishment for every offence; but
that punishment may vary, from a passing inconvenience to
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the utmost evil that man can endure from man. It may be
confined to a temporary financial and commercial derangement, or it may extend to the destruction of the wealth, the
institutions, the independence, the education, and even the
religion of the country. The fear of these dangers generally
prevents deliberate breaches of international law between
great nations.
In the present state of the world, countries of equal, or
nearly equal strength are desirous of mutual peace. War has
become a far more expensive and far more dangerous game
than it was two or even one hundred years ago. Both nations
and sovereigns feel that its risks more than balance the
chances of gain. While the law to which each party appeals
is in its present vague and imperfect state; and while a knowledge of its rules, as far as they may be considered as
established, is so little diffused, it is impossible to prevent the
frequent recurrence of international disputes and very difficult
to adjust them. But as it seldom happens that a nation
intentionally violates what it believes to be that law-except,
indeed, in the case of a neighbor too weak to resist-it
follows that if the rules of international law were full, clear,
and well-known, national disputes would be rare and brief. If
it be important that municipal law should be clear and wellknown, in order to prevent the inconvenience of private litigation, how much more important is it that the rules of international law should be ascertained and studied in order to
prevent war between civilized nations. It is an admitted
principle in international law, that all nations are to be treated
as equal; that all are entitled to similar rights, and to a similar
independence, whatever be their power. But hardly a shadow
of this equality is to be found in practice. In practice, the
treatment which nations receive depends on their force: the
strong dictate, the weak submit, and those whose power is
nearly balanced, negotiate.
Possibly there is no point on which the Law of Nations as
laid down by Grotius, differs more from that which is now
recognized, than as to the treatment of criminal refugees.
Grotius maintains, that a nation is strictly bound either to
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punish or to give them up, but he admits that the injured
nation seldom exacts the performance of this duty, except in
the cases of persons accused of political offences, or of atrocious crimes. But it is now admitted, first, that no nation can
lawfully punish or even try offences committed by foreigners
in a foreign territory; and, secondly, that the extradition of
criminals for trial or punishment in the country where the
crime was committed, is a matter of treaty, and can be re•quired only to the extent and under the circumstances defined
by the treaty; and, thirdly, that political offences are pre,cisely those to which no such treaty ought to extend.
It is scarcely necessary to mention that, of all the countries
-ofthe world, England has by far the greatest interest in maintaining the independence of her mercantile flag in time of war,
and the safety of the property afloat, whether under another
flag or her own. England has almost as many merchant
vessels trading to every part of the globe as all the other
maritime States put together. Her own property in transitu on
the ocean is enormous. She also carries a very large amount
,of merchandise for foreign owners. Her colonies are scattered
over every part of the globe, and the colonial trade and navigation is carried on, like that of these islands, under the British
flag. It is, therefore, of paramount importance to us that in the
.event of war, whether we are neutrals or belligerents, our
commerce should be exposed to as little interruption and
peril as possible. The modern policy of England is to maintain, as far as possible, a strict neutrality when war breaks
out between foreign States, unless her own rights and interests
.are concerned or attacked. During the last forty years six
wars have occurred in which British neutrality has been
successfully maintained-the Franco-Austrian war of 1859,
the Mexican war, the American civil war, the Danish war of
1864, the German war of 1866, and the Franco-German war
of 1870. In each of these conflicts it would have been competent to the belligerent powers, but for the Declaration of
Paris, if they had thought proper, to exercise the ancient belligerent rights,-to arm and commission privateers; to stop
.and search every British vessel on the seas; to take out of
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them any enemy's property found on board; to intercept the
service of our mail-packets all over the world in search for
prohibited articles and correspondence, and to inflict on us as
neutrals an incredible amount of loss and annoyance.
We have reached an epoch in which a spirit of moderation
and a sentiment of equity begin in the elevated sphere of
politics to prevail over the tendencies of an ancient routine,
at once arbitrary and insolent, and over a culpable indifference
to the causes that lead to wars and misfortunes. The grand
epoch, which places the interests of humanity above those of
policy, is the aim towards which every great intelligence turns
in times like these with instinctive sympathy. States between
which there exists a serious cause of disagreement, before
having recourse to arms, should, as far as possible, submit
their differences to the friendly offices of neutral powers.
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